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Although Denmark shares with the other four Nordic countries certain attributes, such 
as pragmatic protestant religion, small and homogenous population, strong social 
democratic parties and ambitious welfare states, it also has its own characteristics. High 
degree of specialization in the so-called low-tech sectors, combined with high mobility 
and income security in labour markets (flexicurity), contributes to making the Danish 
system unique in the world. Denmark has experienced some stagnation in its growth 
over the last decade but still ranks among the top ten in the world in terms of GNP per 
capita, registered unemployment is less than 2 per cent (as of June 2008) while the 
inflation rate has remained moderate. These goals for economic policy have been 
realized in an environment with a high degree of income equality. In this paper we use 
the concepts ‘innovation system’, ‘the learning economy’ and ‘learning modes’ to 
analyse the evolution of the Danish model and what can be learnt from it. My 
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conclusion is that the developing countries can learn from Denmark’s history. The 
integration of farmers and workers through self-organization, education and state 
guaranteed civil rights together with the emancipation of women and young people are 
historical factors that have established the foundation for the current success. Social 
cohesion and egalitarian working life support participatory organizational learning in a 
society characterized both by individualism and by high levels of trust and low levels of 
corruption. 
Acronyms  
CIS3  Third Community Innovation Survey 
DUI  experience-based modes of innovation, referring to learning-by-doing, using and 
interacting 
SMEs  small- and medium-sized enterprises  





Denmark shares with the other four Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden) certain attributes: pragmatic protestant religion, small and homogenous 
population, strong social democratic parties and ambitious welfare states. But it 
certainly has its own personality when compared to the other members of the Nordic 
family. High degree of specialization in so-called low-tech sectors combined with high 
mobility and income security in labour markets (flexicurity) are elements that contribute 
to making the Danish system unique in the world.  
Over the last ten years, the Danish economy has performed well in economic terms. 
Denmark is ranked among the top five in the world in terms of GNP per capita, 
registered unemployment is now (June 2008) probably the lowest in the world (less than 
2 per cent) while the inflation rate remains moderate. These goals for economic policy 
have been realized in an economy with a high degree of income equality. The current 
challenge for Denmark is to transform aspects of the system that hamper its 
performance (weakness in science-based learning and the integration of workers with a 
different cultural background) without undermining the key characteristics that have 
contributed to its success. 
In this paper we use the concepts ‘innovation system’, ‘the learning economy’ and 
‘learning modes’ to analyse the evolution of the Danish model and to determine what 
can be learnt from it. The Danish case shows that it is possible to establish a high level 
of productivity on the basis of experience based learning rooted in broad and intense 
social interaction. We point to ‘congruency’ and ‘matching’ as the two factors 
explaining the success of this egalitarian small-scale low-tech strategy. 
–  The high degree of ‘congruency’ within the national system. Different 
subsystems related to education, work and labour markets support and match the 
industrial structure of the small firm and the predominantly experience-based 
mode of innovation.  
–  The system matches well the current global regime: the globalizing learning 
economy. ‘Flexicurity’ and active labour market policy, networking and 
participation in organizational learning promote swift adaptation and incremental 
innovation. 
The three most important lessons that can be drawn from the Danish case are: 
–  It is not necessary for a national economy to be specialized in high-technology 
products and science-based learning in order to grow rich. 
–  Social capital rooted in high levels of trust that support experience-based learning 
and worker participation in traditional sectors constitutes an important source of 
wealth. 
–  A system where the state interacts positively with civil society can manage the 
social and economic transformations necessary to remain successful in global 
competition.  
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Developing countries may learn from the history of Denmark. The integration of 
farmers and workers through self-organization, education and state guaranteed civil 
rights together with the emancipation of women and young people has established the 
foundation for Denmark’s current success. Social cohesion and egalitarian working life 
supports participatory organizational learning in a society characterized both by 
individualism and by high levels of trust and low levels of corruption.  
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1 Introduction 
Every nation state has its own peculiar history. Nation-specific institutions and 
structures have proven resistant to globalization and they give each national system its 
own distinct ‘personality’. In any specific period certain national systems tend to 
perform better than others in terms of wealth creation and in terms of the quality of life 
that they offer their citizens. Is it possible to learn from the successful examples when 
designing development strategies in the rest of the world? The assumption behind this 
paper is that ‘learning-by-comparing’ is a fruitful exercise while ‘naive benchmarking’ 
where attempts are made to replicate isolated successful institutions or mechanisms 
defined as global ‘best practices’ may lead to unintended and negative consequences 
(Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002).  
One way to explain why ‘naive benchmarking’ does not work is to take the national 
system of innovation as point of departure. This concept was developed in the middle of 
the 1980s (Freeman 1982; Lundvall 1985; Freeman 1987; Freeman and Lundvall 1988) 
and is now used worldwide as tool for analysis and policy. National systems of 
innovation differ in terms of what they do (industrial specialization), what they know 
(reflected in the patterns of patenting and publishing) and in how they work and learn 
(different institutions and different organizational forms). The most important 
dimensions of innovation systems are the patterns of interconnectedness and interaction 
among individuals and organizations.  
2  National systems of innovation: contingency, congruency and adaptability 
National systems of innovation are open systems and the domestic pattern of interaction 
may be more or less well adapted to the global context. For instance, the national 
institutional set-up may be supportive to those generic technologies that offer the 
greatest opportunities in a specific economic era (Perez 1983; Freeman and Perez 1988). 
This implies that the performance of a specific national system is contingent and what 
appears to be a model for the rest of the world in one époque may turn out to be a failure 
at a later stage: the Japanese model was the envy of the world until the middle of the 
1990s when it ran into problems of stagnation. In this paper we argue that Denmark 
benefits from an institutional set-up and a mode of learning that matches the current 
context of the globalizing learning economy well. 
At the foundation of the evolution of the national system are processes of interactive 
learning among agents and organizations within the system. Such forms of interaction 
will tend to develop a certain degree of ‘congruency’ between the pattern of 
specialization in production and knowledge on the one hand and the institutions that 
frame economic processes and learning processes on the other. In this paper we argue 
that there is a good match in Denmark between the different elements of the system. 
The flexible labour market, the education system fostering personal competence and the 
system of lifelong training supported by the public sector match the industrial structure 
well; i.e., small-scale firms often operating in traditional sectors such as food, furniture 
and clothing or in different forms for the more or less advanced service sectors. 
Economic and social equality and related high levels of trust support interactive learning 
between organizations and high degrees of participation in organizational learning.  
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The state may play a more or less autonomous role in relation to the evolution of 
international contingency and internal congruency. When the system gets out of tune 
with the global context and/or when there is growing friction between the production 
system and the institutions that frame it, a new agenda for public policy will present 
itself. The state and the political process may in such situations prove to be more or less 
‘intelligent’ when it comes to coping with the new threats and challenges. In some cases 
the path dependency will be too strong, and attempts and the current institutional set-up 
may be reinforced rather than redesigned. In other cases the outcome of social and 
political conflict may result in new directions of change. This will be reflected in the 
degree of adaptability of the system. In this paper we argue that the Danish history has 
fostered a certain adaptability in this sense. At the core of this adaptability, we find a 
positive relationship between state and civil society. This includes a specific history of 
tripartite interaction in labour market regulation where social partners interact with the 
state but it goes further than that. 
2.1  Brief introduction to the structure of the Danish innovation system 
In Figure A1 of the Appendix we show that out of 36 countries in the European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EC 2006), Denmark is ranked as number five. The breakdown 
of the factors that constitute the background for this position is given in Figure A2, 
which shows that the major strength emanates from ‘lifelong learning’, diffusion of 
broadband services and from innovation activities in small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The proportion of young people who go on to further education and 
the proportion of those who graduate in science and technology is below or around the 
average and the same is true for both the public and the private R&D-efforts.  
The Danish system of innovation is characterized by many SMEs with only a few (in 
international terms) large firms. In general, Danish firms are innovative (in making 
product, process and organizational innovations), but the innovations mainly take the 
form of incremental changes. A big share of the Danish manufacturing value-added, 
employment, and export is within low-tech industries (defined as industries with low 
R&D-intensity), although the share is decreasing. There are some exceptions from the 
traditional dominance of low- and medium-tech sectors, pharmaceuticals and other 
medico-related industries being the most important.  
Low or medium R&D-intensity does not, however, mean that the production is not 
knowledge-intensive. In fact, production in many of the industries characterizing 
Denmark’s so-called low- and medium-tech production is based upon extensive 
knowledge inputs related to a high degree of change and flexibility in firms’ use of 
resources, including rapid diffusion of new technologies and frequent incremental 
product innovation that combines a high level of competence in industrial design with 
advanced organizational techniques and marketing methods. The innovations often 
reflect interaction between skilled labour, engineers, and marketing people. 
2.2  Social and economic performance 
There are different ways to measure the performance of a national economy. The most 
common refers to GNP per capita. Denmark is doing well according to this measure. 
Actually it has been in the top-ten league in this respect for the last ten years. Behind 
this lies a high participation rate in the labour force in general and especially for  
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women. GNP per working hour or per active worker is less impressive but here the 
relative size of the public sector may be a factor that results in a downward bias (value 
added in public service does not include capital income). Measurement of productivity 
in the private sector puts Denmark in a more advantageous position. 
The rate of unemployment is low (less than 2 per cent) and the rate of inflation has 
remained moderate (3.4 per cent). Foreign debt is low and has been reduced 
considerably over the last 15 years. Public debt is also low. 
There are more ‘holistic’ and impressionistic attempts to measure the relative 
performance of national economies. In April 2005 the Intelligence Unit of the British 
weekly The Economist defined Denmark as the most attractive country in the world, as 
seen from the investor’s point of view. In recent years the World Economic Forum has 
presented rankings of international competitiveness where Denmark ranks among the 
top five. 
Figure 1 
Denmark’s position international comparison 2003 
A. Employment rate  B. Rate of unemployment 
   







2.3  The trend in economic growth 
The 1990s was a period of stable economic growth when real GNP/cap increased by 
around 4 per cent per year. The years 2000-03 were characterized by stagnation in GNP 
per capita. Since 2003 the economy has been growing at 3 per cent per annum. The 
global economic crisis will be reflected in 2008 as stagnation, and possibly negative 
growth rates for 2009.  
6 
The cost of living is high in Denmark, and this is reflected in the international rankings 
of Denmark’s economic position. There are thus major differences in rankings based on 
PPP or in terms of USD. Denmark remains among the top five countries in the world 
together with Luxemburg, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland with respect to rankings in 
GNP/cap in USD. When GNP/cap is measured in terms of domestic buying power, 
Denmark’s relative position has weakened in the new millennium, but still ranks among 
the 20 richest countries in the world. 
Figure 2 
GDP per capita 2000 prices, 1997-2006 (DKK 1000) 
 
2.4 Social  performance 
It is well-known that economic indicators such as GNP per capita are not perfect when 
it comes to evaluating social wellbeing. Therefore, international organizations, and 
especially the UN, have defined more complex measures that aim at capturing the social 
dimension more directly. In the most recent statistics—in terms of HDI-index weighting 
education level, life expectancy and GNP/capita in terms of PPP—Denmark ranks 13th 
among the 191 countries included. 
Denmark ranks lower than Iceland, Norway and Sweden with respect to the human 
development index (HDI). One major reason is that while Denmark places high in terms 
of education level, life expectancy is lower despite the country’s high living standards. 
Denmark has a shorter life expectancy (77 years) than more than 30 of the 191 
UN-member countries and this has not improved over the last few years. While the 
Danish life expectancy for men is at the level of other European countries, it is lower for 
women. The emancipation of women has gone far in terms of integrating women in the 
labour market, but it has not completely freed women from the traditional responsibility  
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of taking care of children and housework. Also, women have imitated some of the bad 
habits of men: women in Denmark drink and smoke more than women in most other 
countries.  
A third way to measure welfare is to ask citizens how they perceive the quality of their 
life. During the past 26 years, the world values surveys have asked more than 350,000 
people how happy they are, using the same two questions: ‘Taking all things together, 
would you say you are very happy, rather happy, not very happy, not at all happy?’. 
And, ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?’. Here Denmark comes out at the top. Over the last decades there has been a 
significant increase in the happiness index in several countries, and not just in Denmark. 
According to this survey, Danes are the most satisfied people in the world (the response 
pattern might reflect the fact that each individual is in charge of his own happiness. 
Thus declaring yourself unhappy, would mean accepting the fact that you are 
responsible for your own failure).  
2.5  A Danish paradox? 
Denmark has realized economic and social goals while developing an ambitious welfare 
state. This contrasts with the pro-market bias of standard economics as is articulated in 
the policy advice offered by international organizations such as the OECD and the 
World Bank. Big public expenditure, high and progressive tax rates and generous public 
social schemes have been characterized as hampering to growth. This general message 
has been re-enforced through references to the threat coming from globalization.  
Globalization has thus been referred to as a threat to the welfare state. However, as we 
shall see, globalization does not affect welfare states uniformly, and the Scandinavian 
welfare model actually seems to prosper in the context of globalization. With respect to 
employment, economic growth and labour productivity, the Scandinavian countries 
have since 1990 outperformed not only continental European countries but also the 
neoliberal models of the UK and the US.  
The paradox takes on an extra dimension in Denmark. Some of the success in Finland 
and Sweden may be explained by the extraordinarily heavy investments in R&D and in 
the strong-growth ICT-sectors. This transformation has not taken place in Denmark to 
the same degree where ‘low technology’ industries related to food, textiles and furniture 
still strongly contribute to exports. The absence of big multinational firms has been seen 
as another structural weakness of the Danish economy.  
In this paper we will demonstrate that some of the assumed ‘weaknesses’ tend to 
become ‘strengths’ in the context of the globalizing learning economy where the 
capability and opportunity to learn are the key to success for individuals, organizations 
and regions. They form integral parts of an innovation system founded on 
experience-based learning. In this alternative universe, it is crucial for economic 
performance that a broad segment of the population is engaged in the processes of 
change where they interact to develop, implement and utilize new ideas. And it is here 
that we find the secret behind the success of the Danish model.  
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2.6  A Danish model? 
In Denmark, as in the other Nordic countries, the most important setting for the labour 
market comes from the compromises between centralized trade unions and centralized 
employers’ organization. This is in contrast to systems where rules are set through laws 
enacted by the state. There is a complexity of governmental laws that forms the 
framework for the relative autonomy of the concerned organizations. The most 
important is the state’s mediation authority that can be called upon when disputes 
develop.  
Galenson, the US labour market scholar who introduced the concept ‘the Danish model’ 
already in the early 1950s, refers (1952) mainly to this regulation mode and to the 
relatively peaceful relationships between capital and labour. In this paper we refer to a 
Danish model that covers a wider set of elements and their systemic interdependencies. 
We try to demonstrate that in the context of the current ‘learning economy’, there are 
several mechanisms supporting the dynamic performance of the Danish economy. The 
self-regulated labour market is part of this but there are several other dimensions related 
to the ‘national system of innovation and competence-building’  that need to be 
considered. 
In the long run, ‘adaptability’ may be seen as the most fundamental prerequisite for 
sustained economic growth.1 As we shall see, the adaptability of the Danish system has 
both a macro-political and micro-economic dimension. The macro-political dimension 
may be illustrated by the fact that in periods of crisis, the state, civil society and interest 
groups have interacted and established new frameworks for regulating and changing the 
system. This dimension is discussed in section 2. We see the micro-economic dimension 
of adaptability reflected in interactive learning and incremental innovation as one key 
element behind the strong economic performance. These processes get support from 
institutions related to education, training and labour market and this is the main theme 
for section 3. In section 4 we refer to the globalizing learning economy and we explain 
how the Danish systemic constellation of industrial structure, social cohesion and 
institutions results in strong performance based upon trust and interactive learning. 
3  A history fostering adaptive policy learning 
In this section, we highlight historical events that have resulted in a national system 
where state and civil society in Denmark are more in harmony than in most other 
national systems. We argue that this has resulted in a high degree of system adaptability 
in periods of crisis. We illustrate this by reviewing the postwar period, with a special 
focus on some of the policy changes that took place during the unemployment crisis of 
the 1970-90s. 
                                                 
1   This reflects that the current world is characterized by ‘radical uncertainty’—the only certainty being 
that unforeseeable events will take place in the not too distant future. This can be illustrated during the 
last decades with China and India becoming major players in global competition, climate change 
emerging as a major concern, energy prices exploding and the relationship to fundamentalist Islam 
developing into a major concern for western countries. Just a decade ago, these were all factors 
seemingly to be of secondary importance.  
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3.1  The historical roots of the adaptive governance mode 
Some crucial events in Denmark’s history have shaped both the country’s current 
socioeconomic system, and the patterns of interaction between state and civil society, 
summarized in Box 1. They may also be seen as milestones in the building of social 
cohesion in the Danish society since they were major steps in a process integrating 
farmers and workers as full citizens economically, socially and politically. 
Of these dates, the year 1868 was crucial for the formation of a consensus-oriented 
strategy among decisionmakers. The ruling class had to give up colonial ambitions. The 
event took on a symbolic meaning and led to a shift towards a more introvert national 
strategy with a social dimension. The new slogan was ‘what had been lost outside now 
must be regained domestically’. This implied a common effort aimed at building a 
strong nation and was specifically reflected in major efforts to establish a strong 
national education system. 
It also led to a reorientation of corn exports towards Great Britain, thereby reducing the 
relative importance of the German market. The 1870s became a critical period of crisis 
and transformation, triggered by competition in the export market for corn from US and 
Russia. Danish agriculture had experienced a radical reduction in its exports to Great 
Britain and the agricultural sector had to be transformed. After more than a decade of 
painful adaptation—in which the formation of the farmers’ cooperatives was a crucial 
element—the outcome was a completely transformed agricultural economy 
characterized by the export of livestock products such as butter and bacon, still with the 
UK as a major destination. A key element behind the transformation was the diffusion 
of farmers’ cooperatives processing milk and, later on, meat products (1882).  
A prerequisite for this transformation was a major social innovation; the introduction 
(1852) and rapid diffusion of ‘people’s high schools’ (folkhøjskoler), based on the 
ideology of Grundtvig, a priest and social philosopher. As their major aim, these new 
institutions sough to educate the farmers and give them self-confidence both as 
producers and citizens. The transformation process was driven to a high degree by self-
organization among the farmers but was also supported and legalized by the state. The 
constitution protected the formation of free associations and a new legislation 
supporting the formation of high schools was passed. Already at this stage, a mode of 
public policy interaction was developed whereby civil society and state supported each 
other, especially in periods of economic and social crisis. This mode was further 
developed through major social compromises that resulted in laws recognizing the 
rights of organized labour in 1899 and 1933, respectively. 
In the postwar period, the building of the welfare state and further development of 
labour market institutions ruled by tripartite bodies reinforced this corporatist 
institutional set-up where centralized trade unions and employers’ organizations took on 
major responsibilities in close cooperation with governmental authorities. The fact that 
in the postwar period (until 2001) neither the left- nor the right-wing governments had a 
solid majority in parliament contributed to a climate of consensus seeking. This form of 
governance in which the state and civil society interact parallels the specific form of 
economic dynamics where social equality and economic efficiency go hand in hand. In 
section 3 we indicate how the high degree of equality is transformed into social capital 




Milestones in building national social cohesion in Denmark 
 
1788   Land reform created a class of farmers who were freed from feudal bonds; 
1852   The establishment of the first folk high school for the emancipation of farmers; 
1868   The battle of Dybbøl, ending imperial dreams and triggering national reform; 
1882   The first dairy factory with cooperative ownership; 
1899   September Agreement recognizing rights for the organization of workers and 
employers;  
1933   The Kanslergade Compromise on social reform among major political parties 
 
3.2   Postwar macroeconomic performance and the formation  
of the modern welfare state 
At the end of the war, there was wide concern of a new depression and an active 
economic policy was established that combined Keynesian active finance policy with 
income and wage policy. In the small and increasingly open economy, ‘international 
competitiveness’ was defined as a major objective. This was reflected in a series of 
‘economic policy packages’ designed as social compromises in which the strong, highly 
centralized trade unions accepted wage restraint in exchange for social reforms that 
increased social security and job creation.  
One long-term outcome was an unemployment support system that was more ambitious 
than in most other countries, both in terms of income coverage and the length of 
coverage period. Meanwhile, resources allocated to ‘active labour market’ policy were 
very limited until the 1970s and 1980s. Another critical element of the reforms was to 
establish public care for children and old people. This made all women, including those 
with small children, free to join the labour market and led, at the same time, to the 
creation of jobs attracting mainly women. As a result, the participation rate of women 
became higher than in almost all other countries.2 
Just after the war the economy was still strongly dependent on agriculture and agro-
food. The industrial base was quite weak, and private services and manufacturing were 
mainly connected either to private consumption, public sector or they involved agro-
food, construction and shipping activities. The 1950s constituted a period of transition 
with a major transfer of labour from agriculture to manufacturing and services. Growth 
rates were high but so was the rate of unemployment. In the 1960s there was strong 
growth in public sector activities related to education, health, childcare and care for the 
elderly. Inflation rates became somewhat higher while rates of unemployment were low. 
The rate of labour productivity growth was high. 
This economic policy strategy, aiming at full employment and controlling inflation by a 
combination of (stop-go) finance and incomes, ran into problems at the end of the 1960s 
                                                 
2   Normally, generous unemployment support is assumed to reduce the supply of labour. This 
assumption is not well supported empirically and in the case of Denmark, we can see the opposite 
effect. Participation rates are high in all worker categories, perhaps for the reason that in order to 
become eligible for unemployment support, workers need to be active in the labour market.  
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when deficits in balance of payment and public debt began to increase. The strategy was 
abandoned in the middle of the 1970s after a period of high inflation followed by 
stagflation.  
3.3  A period of crisis and transformation, 1973-90 
In 1973, the rate of unemployment was at record low (40,000, i.e., less than 1 per cent) 
and when this coincided with the first oil crisis, inflation became high and accelerating. 
The subsequent period when restrictive economic policy led to high rates of 
unemployment lasted for almost 20 years, and it was not until 1990 that the rate of 
unemployment dropped below under 10 per cent. Since then, growth rates have been 
stable; unemployment has been shrinking year after year and is now far below what was 
assumed in the 1990s to be ‘the natural rate of unemployment’. 
These two decades witnessed changes in the strategy for economic policy that can be 
perceived as a period of correcting some of weaknesses in the Danish model. There was 
strong pressure to modernize the public sector, to make it both more productive and 
more service-oriented. Labour market policy became much more active. Access to 
unemployment support became more restricted for young workers. Joining the 
European monetary currency collaboration eliminated the active use of currency rate 
policy. Wage restraint was imposed more through high rates of unemployment than 
through explicit wage policy. There was also a shift towards a longer-term perspective 
on international competitiveness, moving the focus towards innovative capabilities and 
other non-price factors. 
4  The institutional setting for labour markets and education 
4.1  Self regulation of the labour market: a key element of the Danish Model 
In the Danish model, similar to the other Nordic countries, the most important setting 
for labour market rules is based on compromises between the centralized trade unions 
and employers’ organization. These rules create a framework that allows some lee-way 
for further specification at the sector level and there is even room for adapting the rules 
further to a specific firm or even to specific worker. This is in contrast to the systems in 
which rules are set by state laws. 
There are complex governmental laws behind the autonomy of the relevant 
organizations. The most important is the mediation authority of the state that can be 
called upon when disputes develop. Strikes can be called off by the state and in this 
situation the mediation authority can force an agreement upon the parties. Normally, the 
compromise will be designed in such a way that it comes close to what would have 
become the final outcome of a conflict. 
Galenson, the US labour market scholar Galenson (1952), refers mainly to this 
regulation mode of the relationship of capital and labour. The model has changed over 
time, especially with regard to the roles played at the central, sector, local and 
individual level in shaping wage and working condition but some basic characteristics 
still remain unchanged. The 1990s have seen a further decentralization of negotiations 
to the level of the single firm, but these negotiations have to respect the framework set 
by national and sector agreements.  
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In this paper we sketch a broader version of the Danish model. We try to demonstrate 
that in the context of the current ‘learning economy’, there are several mechanisms that 
support the dynamic performance of the Danish economy. The self-regulated labour 
market is part of this but there are other dimensions that are related to the ‘national 
system of innovation and competence-building’ that need to be considered.  
4.2  The education system and the characteristics of Danish comprehensive schools 
Central and local governments are the main providers of education at primary and 
secondary levels. Generally speaking, curricula, study programmes, textbooks, etc., as 
well as most teachers, acknowledge that supporting communicative and cooperative 
skills and ‘social competence’ is a major task of the school system. Informal institutions 
supporting interactive learning and innovation in the economy are provided by the 
school system, even when not explicitly recognized.3 
It is somewhat trivial to state that there is mutual influence between a nation’s culture 
and its school system. National school system actually plays a crucial role in the 
formation of modern nation states. The history of education in Denmark has its own 
unique features. It is characterized by a combination of state responsibility for funding 
and for the quality of the schooling, but a high degree of freedom exists when it comes 
to organizing education according to different cultural values and pedagogical methods. 
The outcome of Grundtvig and his emphasis on people’s high schools where popular 
learning without formal diplomas took place among adults, still plays a role in shaping 
the debate regarding schools. 
In Denmark young people and schoolchildren spend less time on homework than in 
other countries. Instead, they often use their free time to work and earn money for their 
personal consumption, at levels exceeding those afforded by children in other countries. 
Many of the young have appropriated a wage earner-role while still in school, achieving 
early independence, also economically, from their parents. 
In the Danish primary and secondary school, the atmosphere is more democratic and 
informal than in larger European countries such as France, Germany and the UK. Pupils 
at an early age become accustomed to discussing with and questioning their teachers 
and other authorities; they also become accustomed to cooperating in groups. Taken 
together these elements in the framework of youth education encourage a number of 
personal qualifications: the ability to accept responsibility as well as to communicate 
and to work with others—qualifications meeting the requirements of modern firms that 
must operate in an extremely turbulent environment (Lundvall 2002). 
4.3  The labour market as a framework for knowledge creation and learning 
Denmark’s labour market, like its education system, has particularities that make it 
unique from an international perspective. These are essential in explaining the existence 
of a particular Danish mode of learning and innovation (Madsen 2006). High 
                                                 
3   Recently recognition of the importance of social skills has, however, become somewhat ambivalent. 
In the political debate on education, the proposition that too much time is devoted to social 
competence and too little to basic skills like mathematics, language and concrete facts about 
geography, history, etc., seems to be gaining more support.  
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participation rates, high mobility in terms of job changes, publicly organized and 
relatively generous unemployment support, considerable latitude for hiring and firing 
workers, and basic social security provided by a developed welfare state constitute some 
of the most important institutional characteristics of the Danish labour market. As a 
result the labour market is characterized by great flexibility with regard to job changes 
between workplaces, resembling in this regard the labour market in the US. 
But in contrast to the US-model, the publicly organized system of unemployment 
support is more generous than in most other European countries. In the international 
context, it has a high substitution rate and a long period during which benefits can be 
drawn. This is reflected in surveys that show that Danish wage earners, despite frequent 
job changes and with little legally mandated employment security, express little concern 
over job insecurity, as compared to wage earners in other European countries (OECD 
1997: 132 ff.). 
As mentioned above, the Danes participate in the labour market to a much higher degree 
than the EU average. At first glance, this seems paradoxical, since the combination of a 
high tax burden and public subsidies should discourage active workforce participation. 
Economists have shown that, because of the tax system, a significant proportion of 
workers, especially women, gain little from being active in the labour market. One 
reason for remaining active may be that Danish workers, and women in particular, place 
considerable value on having a job and the individual independence it brings. 
The high mobility in the labour market also reflects the Danish industrial structure with 
its large share of small workplaces and firms. As a result of this combination of high 
mobility and small workplaces, the incentives for employers to invest in the education 
of their own employees are weak. To compensate for this, Denmark has established a 
publicly financed system of continued education that is rather unique. Of the adult 
workforce, a greater proportion than in other countries continue with their education, 
and the public authorities use a greater share of GNP on adult education than anywhere 
else in the world. Thus, the public sector has taken on a role that the small Danish 
companies would have difficulty in fulfilling on their own. 
4.4 Consequences  for  learning  and the modes of innovation 
A picture emerges in which competence in the Danish business life develops primarily 
through recruitment and only secondarily through the establishment of internal 
education and further schooling under the auspices of the firm. The high level of 
mobility is not limited merely to unskilled labour, but also applies to technicians, 
academics and even top management. This is the setting of the Danish firms for 
participating in the learning economy. The high mobility parallels the levels noted in 
high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, and has both positive and negative aspects. 
On the positive side, firms are able to recruit experienced employees from other firms. 
The relatively large flow of competent manpower between firms results in a rapid 
diffusion of new ideas through the economy. It also provides a foundation for 
interaction between firms, since workers to a great extent have relationships with 
colleagues in other firms. 
These advantages are especially attainable for clusters of firms located in ‘industrial 
districts’, the agglomerations of firms that share a common industrial and technological  
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specialization In such regions, specialized labour markets will appear; these will have 
workers with a high level of competence, and the exchange of knowledge through job 
changes between companies will be intense. In such an environment, firms may also 
become more willing to invest resources in the education of their own employees, 
because they can count on a return on their investment indirectly in the form of new 
employees educated by other firms. In such a context, it is important to note that this is 
matched by labour market policy that is partially regionalized and involves 
representatives from trade unions and employee organizations. 
5  The learning economy as context 
While the postwar period in Denmark has been characterized by periods of up- and 
downturns, long-term success is reflected in a high GNP per capita, and the economy 
performs in the current situation quite well. In order to explain the relative success of the 
Danish economy, it is necessary to understand the global context within which it operates. 
5.1  The learning economy 
In various contexts, we have introduced a concept using the term ‘the learning economy’ 
(Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Archibugi and Lundvall 2001). The intention is to mark a 
distinction from the more commonly used term ‘the knowledge-based economy’. The 
learning economy concept signals that the most important change is not the more 
intensive use of knowledge in the economy but rather that knowledge becomes obsolete 
more rapidly than before; therefore it is imperative that firms engage in organizational 
learning and that workers constantly attain greater competence and new skills. 
Extensive utilization of information technology has become a prerequisite for 
competitiveness. In all parts of the economy, including the so-called low-technology 
sectors, the use of scientific knowledge offers new opportunities for firms. Codified 
knowledge is becoming more important than before, especially in high-income 
countries. But these changes, in conjunction with global competition, increase the rate 
of transformation and change. As a result, both individuals and companies are 
increasingly confronted with problems that can be solved only by forgetting old 
methods and acquiring new ones. The rapid rate of change is evidence of an intensified 
competition, leading to a selection of organizations and individuals capable of rapid 
learning, and thus further accelerating the rate of change. 
The transition to a learning economy confronts individuals and companies as well as 
national institutions with new challenges. For the individual, it becomes imperative to 
be able to upgrade skills or to have access to new ones over one’s lifecycle. Finding a 
workplace where there are opportunities to learn new skills may become more important 
than the initial high salary. In the education system, a strong emphasis on teaching basic 
subjects as language and mathematics needs to be combined with the promotion of what 
is sometimes referred to as ‘personal skills’ or ‘social skills’. The capacity to learn 
becomes essential in the learning economy; it is problematic that the national Pisa-tests 
do not emphasize these areas of competence.  
At the level of the firm, we can see the growing emphasis on new organizational forms 
that promote functional flexibility and networking as responses to the challenges posed  
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by the learning economy. In a rapidly changing environment it is not efficient to operate 
a hierarchical organization with many vertical layers and with departments and 
functions operating separately within the firm. It takes too long to respond when the 
information obtained at the lower levels has to be transmitted to the top and back down 
to the bottom of the pyramid. In many instances big vertically integrated companies are 
less effective than the smaller units engaged in relational contracting and networking. 
An increasingly important dimension of competition is how attractive a firm is for 
labour and this will be reflected in the learning opportunities that it offers its employees. 
This is correlated to the degree of participation and autonomy offered to workers.  
The challenge for national economies is to combine a strong science base with national 
institutions that promote individual, organizational and inter-organizational learning. 
Labour markets may combine high mobility with strong public investments in training 
or less mobility with strong investment in in-house training. In a recent paper (Jensen et 
al. 2007) based upon Danish data, we demonstrate that firms that combine a strong 
version of science-based learning with a strong version of experience-based 
(organizational) learning are the ones that are most innovative (see Box 2).  
The strong performance of the Danish economy reflects micro-relationships in the 
system that are supported by institutions such the welfare state, gender relationships, 
education and labour markets (discussed above). We would argue that the performance 
reflects the fact that the system is especially effective in terms of DUI-learning. In a 
global context (the globalizing learning economy) where the rate of change is high, the 




Combining science-based (STI) and experience-based (DUI) modes 
 of innovation promotes product innovation4 
The table below, taken from Jensen et al. (2007), is based upon a clustering of 692 Danish 
firms. The odds ratio compares the propensity to innovate using the low learning cluster 
(either DUI or STI) as benchmark. Also when sector, size and ownership are brought in as 
control variables, we find that firms that combine the use of scientific knowledge with 
organizational learning are more than twice as active in terms of introducing product 











        With control variables 
STI cluster   3.529  1.2611**    2.355  0.8564** 
DUI cluster   2.487  0.9109**    2.218  0.7967** 
DUI/STI cluster  7.843  2.0596**    5.064  1.6222** 
N 692  692    692  692 
** means significant at the 1% level.     
 
                                                 
4   STI refers to the chain science, technology and innovation, while DUI refers to learning by doing 
(Arrow 1962), by using (Rosenberg 1982) and by interacting (Lundvall 1985; Lundvall 2006).  
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5.2  The high level of trust 
In the US-dominated literature, trust is considered to be rooted in civil society and the 
frequency of participation in civic activities has been used as an indicator of ‘social 
capital’ (Woolcock 1998). It has been said that big government and big public sectors 
undermine civil society, and thereby also social capital. The Scandinavian experience 
shows that growth in a welfare state has not reduced the participation in civic 
organizations and that levels of trust are much higher in the Scandinavian countries than 
in countries with a much smaller public sector. In particular, there is a strong correlation 
between the use of general (rather than selective) social welfare programmes and 
generalized trust. 
According to the European Social Survey, trust among agents seems to be consistently 
higher in Denmark than elsewhere (see Table 1) and this, combined with the small size 
of the system, results in a high degree of interaction among agents both within and 
across organizations. This gives rise not only to low ‘transaction costs’ but more 
importantly to processes of interactive learning where new insights about technologies 
and good organizational practices are diffused rapidly and at low ‘learning costs’. The 
Danish innovation system, although rather weak until recently in terms of its production 
of codified knowledge through its R&D-efforts, has been highly successful in terms of 
learning by doing, learning by using and learning by interacting.  
The high frequency of interaction is reflected both in industrial networking and in the 
patterns of work organization. In the next section we illustrate, first, that innovating 
Danish firms are more engaged in collaboration with customers and competitors than 
the average for Europe and that workers are more engaged in ‘discretionary learning’ 
than in other countries with the exception of the Netherlands. 
Table 1 
Index of trust in 14 European countries based upon the European Social Survey 
  2002 2004 2006 
Denmark  7.2 7.0 7.2 
Finland  6.7 6.7 6.7 
Norway  6.8 6.8 6.9 
Sweden  6.4 6.3 6.5 
France  5.0 5.1 5.1 
UK  5.3 5.3 5.6 
Germany  5.2 5.2 5.2 
Netherlands  5.9 6.0 6.0 
Belgium  5.2 5.2 5.4 
Ireland  5.7 6.0 5.6 
Austria  5.3 5.5 5.4 
Spain  5.0 5.0 5.3 
Hungary  4.5 4.3 4.5 
Switzerland  5.9 6.1 6.1 
Note:  In the European Social Survey, respondents are asked two questions (‘Do you trust most 
people?’ and ‘Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they got the 
chance?’) with responses varying between 1-10. The index gives the average response. 
5.3  Networking, interactive learning and innovation 
According to the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3), Danish firms collaborate 
with other firms more frequently than the average in Europe (Christensen et al. 2008).  
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Table 2 shows that this is true for collaboration within the same concern as well as for 
collaboration with competing firms and customers. Collaboration with universities has 
grown from a very low level of 17 per cent in 1998 to the EU average which is around 30 
per cent.5 The high frequency of inter-organizational collaboration, which we assume to 
reflect high degrees of trust, is of great importance for the innovative performance of an 
economy where there are only few major big companies.  
Table 2 
Collaboration partners, 1998-2000 
Collaboration partner  Total CIS3-DK  Total CIS3-EU 
Firms within same concern  65  42 
Suppliers 60  61 
Clients and customers  55  50 
Competitors 34  29 
Consultants 46  41 
Private labs and R&D firms  22  22 
Universities & other higher education institutes  29  31 
Public & private non-commercial research centres 21  20 
Note:   CIS3-DK is based on an extended population including supplementary data from construction 
and selected service industries in order to fit the Danish R&D statistics. CIS3-EU is equivalent to 
the Eurostat dataset.  
Source:   The Danish Institute for Studies in Research and Research Policy (2003), CIS3-DK, Table 15 & 
CIS3-EU, Table 32a. 
5.4  On the importance of learning at the workplace 
We have argued that the Danish education system and the labour market institutions 
support participatory learning at the workplace. In the last sections of this paper we will 
present an analysis how work and learning take place in the different European 
economies supporting this option.  
Lorenz and Valeyre (2006) develop an original and informative EU-wide mapping of 
how employees work and learn in the private sector. This mapping makes it possible to 
see to what degree Danish employees are engaged in learning at the workplace. 
Cluster analysis is used to identify four different systems of work organization: 
–  Discretionary learning 
–  Lean 
–  Taylorist 
–  Traditional forms. 
Two of these, the discretionary learning and lean forms, are characterized by high levels 
of learning and problem-solving on the job. The principal difference between 
discretionary learning and lean clusters is the relatively high level of discretion or 
                                                 
5   Christensen, Drejer and Vinding (2004) find that collaboration on product development has 
not increased between 1997 and 2004, but the pattern of collaborating partners has changed: 
firms have more different types of partners, and collaboration with knowledge institutions 
has increased significantly. Especially collaboration with universities increased from 17 per 
cent to 29 per cent, much the same pattern as that noted in CIS.  
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autonomy exercised at work by employees grouped in the former. Task complexity is 
also higher in the discretionary learning cluster than in the lean cluster.  
Discretionary learning thus refers to work settings where a lot of responsibility is given 
to the employee who is expected to solve problems on his or her own. Employees 
operating in these modes are constantly confronted with ‘disequilibria’ and as they cope 
with these, they learn and become more competent. But in this process they face also 
the experience of having some of their earlier insights and skills become obsolete. 
Lean production also involves problem-solving and learning but here the problems are 
more narrowly defined and the set of possible solutions more limited. The work is 
highly constrained and this points to a more structured or bureaucratic style of 
organizational learning that corresponds rather closely to the characteristics of the 
Japanese inspired ‘lean production’-model. 
The other two clusters are characterized by relatively low levels of learning and 
problem-solving. The taylorist form leaves very little autonomy to the employee in 
making decisions. In the traditional cluster there is more autonomy but learning and task 
complexity are the lowest among the four types of work organization. This cluster 
includes employees working in small-scale establishments in personal services and 
transport where methods, for the most part, are informal and non-codified. 
Table 3 shows that people working in different national systems of innovation and 
competence, work and learn differently. Discretionary learning is most widely diffused 
in the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and to a lesser extent in Austria and Germany. 
The lean model is in evidence mostly in the UK, Ireland and Spain. The taylorist forms 
 
Table 3 
National differences in organizational models  









North    
Netherlands 64.0  17.2  5.3  13.5 
Denmark 60.0  21.9 6.8  11.3 
Sweden 52.6  18.5  7.1  21.7 
Finland 47.8  27.6  12.5  12.1 
Centre        
Austria 47.5  21.5  13.1  18.0 
Germany 44.3 19.6  14.3  21.9 
Luxemburg 42.8  25.4  11.9  20.0 
Belgium 38.9  25.1  13.9  22.1 
France 38.0  33.3  11.1  17.7 
West        
United Kingdom  34.8  40.6  10.9  13.7 
Ireland 24.0  37.8  20.7  17.6 
South        
Italy 30.0  23.6  20.9  25.4 
Portugal 26.1  28.1  23.0  22.8 
Spain 20.1  38.8  18.5  22.5 
Greece 18.7  25.6  28.0  27.7 
EU-15 39.1  28.2  13.6  19.1 
Source:   Adapted, based on Lorenz and Valeyre (2006). 
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are more present in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, while the traditional forms are 
similarly more common in these four southern European countries.6 Within the Nordic 
group, Denmark is the extreme in terms of its high share of discretionary learning and 
low share of taylorist workplaces.7 
Table 4 indicates the unequal access to learning in different parts of Europe. Denmark 
and Netherlands have few taylorist jobs remaining in the economy, as the majority of 
employees operate in jobs that are demanding both in terms of skills and in terms of 
autonomy. We see this as a major explanation of the success of the Danish economy in 
the current context of rapid change. 
5.5  Degree of inequality in access to organizational learning in Europe  
An egalitarian income distribution may not be the most important dimension of social 
equality. If it is combined with a widening gap in competence between the skilled and 
the low-skilled workers, it could result in the underemployment of the low-skilled. From 
a more theoretical welfare point of view, Sen (1999) argues that inequality should be 
related more to capabilities than to the static distribution of income. The data referred to 
above on organizational models of learning in different European countries makes it 
possible to find indicators of the more dynamic and adequate measures of inequality.  
In Table 4 we present an indicator for the inequality of workplace learning 
opportunities. We distinguish between ‘workers’ and ‘managers’ and we compare their 
access to discretionary learning in different national systems.8 Table 4 shows that 
employees at the high end of the professional hierarchy have easier access to jobs 
involving discretionary learning. This is true for all the countries listed. But it is also 
noteworthy that the data indicate that the inequality in access to learning varies across 
different countries. Denmark, together with Netherlands, has the lowest ‘inequality 
index’. This index is much higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in the south of 
Europe.  
For instance, the proportion of the management category engaged in discretionary 
learning in Portugal is almost as high as in Finland (62 per cent in Finland and 59 per 
cent in Portugal), but the proportion of workers engaged in discretionary learning is 
much lower in Portugal (18.2 per cent versus 38.2 per cent).  
                                                 
6   Lorenz and Valeyre (2006) use logit regression analysis in order to control for differences in sector, 
occupation and establishment size when estimating the impact of nation on the likelihood of 
employees being grouped in the various forms of work organization. The results show statistically 
significant ‘national effect’ also when controlling for the structural variables, thus pointing to 
considerable latitude in how work is organized for the same occupation or within the same industrial 
sector. 
7   In Arundel et al. (2007) we have shown that there is correlation between the discretionary learning 
mode and the frequency of radical innovations when different European national systems are 
compared. 
8   The class of managers includes not only top and middle management but also professionals and 
technicians (ISCO major groups 1, 2 and 3) The worker category includes clerks, service and sales 
personnel as well as craft, plant and machine operators and unskilled occupations (ISCO major groups 
4 through 9).  
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This pattern indicates that the Danish society is the most egalitarian not only in terms of 
income distribution, but also with respect to access to learning; its distribution is more 
equal than elsewhere. The combination of the welfare state’s offer of some kind of basic 
security, equal income distribution and low social distance is reflected in high degrees 
of trust and in a broad participation in change. While there are tendencies towards 
polarization in the current context also in Denmark, it still benefits from social capital 
rooted in an egalitarian society that supports interactive learning and dynamic economic 
efficiency. 
Table 4 
National differences in organizational models 
 (% of employees by organizational class) 
 Discretionary 
learning 
Share of managers in
 discretionary learning 




North        
Netherlands 64.0  81.6  51.1  37.3 
Denmark 60.0  85.0  56.2  35.9 
Sweden 52.6  76.4  38.2  50.3 
Finland 47.8  62.0  38.5  37.9 
Austria 47.5  74.1  44.6  39.9 
Centre        
Germany 44.3  65.4  36.8  43.8 
Luxemburg 42.8  70.3  33.1  52.9 
Belgium 38.9  65.7  30.8  53.1 
France 38.0  66.5  25.4  61.9 
West        
UK 34.8  58.9  20.1  65.9 
Ireland 24.0  46.7  16.4  64.9 
South        
Italy 30.0  63.7  20.8  67.3 
Portugal 26.1  59.0  18.2  69.2 
Spain 20.1  52.4  19.1  63.5 
Greece 18.7  40.4  17.0  57.9 
Note:  * The index is constructed by dividing the share of ‘workers’ engaged in discretionary learning by 
the share of 'managers' engaged in discretionary learning and subtracting the resulting 
percentage from 100. If the share of workers and managers is the same, the index equals 0, and 
if the share of workers is 0, the index would equal 100. 
Source:   Lundvall, Rasmussen and Lorenz (2008). 
6  What lessons can be learnt for development strategies? 
The Danish society is based on a high degree of trust among its citizens. This makes 
transactions less costly and interactive learning more efficient. It might appear as a 
paradox but the kind of ‘social capital’ that lies behind the dynamic efficiency of the 
economy emanates from the security offered by the welfare state. American scholars see 
public expenditure as being equal to ‘transaction costs’ (North 1996) and the welfare 
state as undermining social capital (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1996). The experience of 
Denmark and the other Nordic countries points in a different direction. 
As the public sector has taken over some of the responsibility for the care of children 
and the elderly, it has contributed to the creation of a highly individualist social system 
where traditional social institutions such as family and religion play a minor role. The 
welfare state and the individual’s legal and social rights make it possible for all 
population segments (women, youth and old people) to become sovereign subjects. This  
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makes generalized interpersonal trust an attractive option (and somewhat of a necessity 
for individual survival). The downside is that it places a heavy responsibility on each 
individual for managing his/her own happiness. Failure to succeed may result in serious 
crises for the individual (or, in an extreme case, suicide). It is a normative question how 
far the less developed countries want to go in this direction.  
Another critical element behind the dynamic efficiency of the Danish system is the 
homogeneity of the population in terms of ethnicity and culture. This homogeneity 
contributes to generalized trust, low transaction costs and efficiency of interactive 
learning. Today, this strength has induced some negative consequences, as reflected in 
the unsatisfactory work and social integration of peoples with different ethnical and 
cultural background. The only way out of this problem consistent with Danish history 
would be to invest massively in education and training to make it possible for the 
newcomers to become full—and fully accepted—members of the ‘Danish village 
economy’ (Maskell 2004). The alternative would be either to dismantle central elements 
of the Danish model or to engage in promoting selective immigration of high skilled 
workers. 
Some important lessons that can be drawn from the Danish experience are historical. 
The current success reflects a high degree of social cohesion and the historical 
background for this was:  
–  The early rise of a broad based and democratic system of education: the first law 
on generalized basic education was introduced already in 1814; 
–  The social, economic, cultural and political emancipation of farmers and workers 
in which the social struggle resulted in peaceful reform processes. Local 
democracy goes far back in history while general suffrage for parliament was 
established 1915. 
One important lesson to be drawn from the current strong performance may be the 
potential benefits from ‘flexicurity’ as a way to organize the labour market. The 
combination of high flexibility in labour markets (few restrictions on employers for 
firing employees and high rates of inter-organizational mobility) and income security 
for those becoming unemployed seems to be especially effective in the current context 
where there is a need for both high mobility and commitment to change among workers 
and citizens. 
Another important lesson is that the broad participation of workers in the 
decisionmaking process is an advantage in an environment characterized by rapid 
change, and that such broad participation needs an active labour market policy as well 
as investments in education and training for both the young generations and for adult 
workers. The Danish example illustrates how this kind of participation can flourish in a 
society with a high degree of social and economic equality.  
The history and current reality of Denmark, in some respects, are very far from the 
reality of most developing countries. Nonetheless, the Danish model may be useful in 
orienting development strategies. Also when the starting point is modest, development 
strategies could constitute a parallel effort for upgrading the professional skills of 
workers and farmers, as well as their self-confidence through broad education on the 
one hand and on the other, a gradual enhancement of the role they play in the 
transformation of working life and society.  
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The Danish case shows that successful national innovation systems may be reinforced 
by upgrading the skills of farmers and linking the upgrading of the knowledge base of 
agriculture to the formation of new industries. It is only in the most recent years that 
science-based economic activities and high technology sectors have began to contribute 
substantially to economic growth in Denmark. 
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